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Abstract— Are rewards or penalties more effective in influ-
encing user behavior? This work compares the effectiveness of
subsidies and tolls in incentivizing users in congestion games.
The predominantly studied method of influencing user behavior
in network routing problems is to institute taxes which alter
users’ observed costs in a manner that causes their self-
interested choices to more closely align with a system-level
objective. Another feasible method to accomplish the same goal
is to subsidize the users’ actions that are preferable from a
system-level perspective. We show that, when users behave sim-
ilarly and predictably, subsidies offer comparable performance
guarantees to tolls while requiring smaller monetary transac-
tions with users; however, in the presence of unknown player
heterogeneity, subsidies fail to offer the same performance
as tolls. We further investigate these relationships in affine
congestion games, deriving explicit performance bounds under
optimal tolls and subsidies with and without user heterogeneity;
we show that the differences in performance can be significant.
I. INTRODUCTION
In systems governed by a collective of multiple decision
making users, the system performance is often dictated
by the choices those users make. Though each user may
make decisions rationally, the emergent behavior observed
in the system need not align with the objective of the
system designer. This phenomenon appears in many highly
studied settings including distributed control [1], resource
allocation problems [2], [3], and transportation networks [4].
An effective metric to quantify this apparent inefficiency is
the price of anarchy, defined as the worst-case ratio between
the social welfare from users making self interested decisions
and the optimal social welfare [5].
A promising method of mitigating this inefficiency is by
introducing incentives to the system’s users, influencing their
decisions to more closely align with the system optimal [6].
One example of such incentives is to assign taxes, eliciting
monetary fees from users that will affect their preferences
over the available actions [7]–[9]. Such taxes have been
shown to be effective in reducing system inefficiency with
respect to the price of anarchy ratio [10]–[13]. Another
method to influence user behavior is to subsidize actions that
are preferential from a system designer perspective. Though
the use of subsidies is equally feasible in theory and in
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implementation (less any budgetary constraints on the system
designer), this method has been studied significantly less than
the tax equivalent; the relative performance of each is thus
unknown.
In this paper, we seek to understand the relative perfor-
mance of subsidies and taxes in influencing user behavior in
sociotechnical systems such as transportation networks.
Specifically, we consider a network routing problem in
which users must traverse a network with congestable edges
with delays that grow as a function of the local mass of
users. Finding a route for each user that minimizes the total
latency in the system is straightforward if the system designer
has full control in directing the users. However, when users
select their own routes, the resulting network flow need not
be optimal [14]. Modeling the selfish routing problem as
a non-atomic congestion game, we adopt the Nash flow as
a solution concept of the emergent behavior in the system.
Due to users selfish routing, the price of anarchy may be
large [15]. It is for this reason that we introduce incentives
which alter the players’ observed costs so that the resulting
Nash flow will more closely resemble the optimal flow.
A well studied method of incentivizing users in congestion
games is to tax the users, or introduce tolls to paths in
the network [7]–[13], [16], [17]. In each of these settings,
the effectiveness of these tolls is measured via the price
of anarchy. Indeed in the most elementary settings, tolls
exist that influence users to self route inline with the system
optimum [14]. However, when more nuance is introduced in
the form of player heterogeneity (i.e., players differing in
their response to incentives), the task of designing tolls be-
comes more involved. If the toll designer possesses sufficient
knowledge of the network structure and user population, they
may still compute and implement tolls which incentivize
optimal routing [13]; however, in the case where the system
designer has some uncertainty in the network parameters or
behavior of the user population, tolls are often designed to
minimize the price of anarchy ratio [9], [18], [19], and again,
encouraging results exist. Many of these works however, do
not consider the magnitude of the tax levied on the users.
To this end, we consider that additional budgetary constraints
may be imposed in the form of bounds on the incentives. The
authors of [16], [19] consider such restrictions on tolls, but
only in the context of small classes of networks and restrict
incentives to positive taxes.
Though the study of tolling in congestion games is exten-
sive, there are few results regarding subsidies as incentives in
this context. In [20], the authors investigate budget-balancing
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tolls in which the amount of tax incentives equals the amount
of subsidies, but the results exist only with homogeneous
users. The authors of [21] consider more general incentives,
but in an evolutionary setting. From a system designer’s per-
spective, subsidies may be a feasible method of influencing
user behavior; the performance guarantees of subsidies is
thus of interest as well as how this performance compares
to tax incentives.
In this work, we compare the performance of tolls and
subsidies in congestion games in the presence of budgetary
constraints and user heterogeneity. Our results are outlined
as follows:
Theorem 1: With homogeneous users, we show that, with
a similar budgetary constraint, the optimal bounded
subsidy performs no worse than the optimal bounded
toll and in many cases performs strictly better.
Theorem 2: In contrast, when users differ in their response
to incentives, we give a result that shows tolls are
inherently more robust to player heterogeneity than
subsidies.
Proposition 3: We characterize the optimal bounded tolls
and subsidies in affine congestion games along with their
associated performance guarantees.
Proposition 4: We identify the effect of player heterogeneity
on similar toll and subsidy mechanisms in affine conges-
tion games.
The first two results hold for general classes of non-
atomic congestion games, and illustrate the relation between
subsidies and tolls: for homogeneous users, subsidies can
offer similar performance to tolls with smaller monetary
transactions, but the presence of player heterogeneity de-
grades this performance more dramatically with subsidies
than with tolls. The final propositions illustrate this result in
the well studied class of affine congestion games
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
Consider a directed graph (V,E) with vertex set V , edge
set E ⊆ (V × V ), and k origin-destination pairs (oi, di).
Denote by Pi the set of all simple paths connecting origin
oi to destination di. Further, let P = ∪ki=1Pi denote the set
of all paths in the graph. A flow on the graph is a vector
f ∈ R|P|≥0 that expresses the mass of traffic utilizing each
path. The mass of traffic on an edge e ∈ E is thus fe =∑
P :e∈P fP , and we say f = {fe}e∈E . A flow f is feasible
if it satisfies
∑
P∈Pi fP = ri for each source-destination
pair, where ri is the mass of traffic traveling from origin oi
to destination di.
Each edge e ∈ E in the network is endowed with a non-
negative, non-decreasing latency function `e : R≥0 → R≥0
that maps the mass of traffic on an edge to the delay users
on that edge observe. The system cost of a flow f is the total
latency,
L(f) =
∑
e∈E
fe · `e(fe). (1)
A routing problem is specified by the tuple G =
(V,E, {`e}e∈E , {ri, (oi, di)}ki=1), and we let F(G) denote
the set of all feasible flows. We define the optimal flow fopt
as one that minimizes the total latency, i.e.,
fopt ∈ argmin
f∈F(G)
L(f). (2)
We will denote a family of routing problems by G.
B. Incentives & Heterogeneity
In this paper, we consider the problem of selfish routing,
where each user in the system chooses a path as to minimize
their own observed delay. Define Ni as the set of users
traveling from origin oi to destination di. Each user x ∈ Ni
is thus free to choose between paths P ∈ Pi. Let each Ni
be a closed interval with Lebesgue measure µ(Ni) = ri that
is disjoint from each other set of users, i.e., Ni ∩ Nj =
∅ ∀ i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j. The full set of agents is thus
N = ∪ki=1Ni whose mass is µ(N) =
∑k
i=1 ri. Without loss
of generality, we can let µ(N) = 1.
It is well known that selfish routing can lead to sub-
optimal system performance [15]. It is therefore up to a
system designer to select a set of incentive functions τe :
[0, 1] → R ∀e ∈ E to influence the behavior of the users
in the system to more closely align with the system optimal
flow. These incentives can be regarded as monetary transfers
with the users dependent on the paths they choose.
In this work, we consider that users may differ in their
response to incentives. Specifically, each player x ∈ N
is associated with a sensitivity sx ≥ 0 to incentives. We
call s : N → R≥0 a sensitivity distribution. We highlight
the case where sx = c ∀x ∈ N for some constant c as
a homogeneous distribution of user sensitivities1, in which
each user behaves similarly; any other distribution will be
referred to as a population of heterogeneous users.
A user x ∈ Ni traveling on a path Px ∈ Pi will observe
cost
Jx(Px, f) =
∑
e∈Px
`e(fe) + sxτe(fe). (3)
A flow f is a Nash flow if
Jx(Px, f) ∈ argmin
P∈Pi
{∑
e∈P
`e(fe) + sxτe(fe)
}
∀x ∈ Ni, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. (4)
A game is therefore characterized by a network G, player
sensitivity distribution s, and a set of incentive functions
{τe}e∈E , denoted by the tuple (G, s, {τe}e∈E). It is shown
in [22] that a Nash flow will exist in a congestion game of
this form if the latency and incentive functions are Lebesgue-
integrable.
C. Incentive Mechanisms & Performance Metrics
To determine the manner in which incentive functions are
applied to edges, we investigate incentive mechanisms. To
formalize this notion, we denote L(G) as the set of latency
functions in the routing problem G. Further, for a family
1Without loss of generality, we use sx = 1 for a homogeneous
population.
of problems, we denote L(G) = ∪G∈GL(G) as the set of
latency functions that occur in the family of games G.
An example of this would be the well studied family of
affine congestion games Gaff , in which each edge has an
affine latency function, i.e.,
L(Gaff) = {`(f) = af + b | a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0}.
An incentive mechanism T assings to an edge e with
latency `e an incentive T (`e), i.e. τe(fe) = T (`e)[fe], where
T (`e)[fe] is the incentive evaluated at fe. This mapping
is denoted T : L(G) → T where T is some set of
allowable incentive functions. Using this framework allows
us to consider a large variety of incentives and congestion
games, including cases where G possess a finite or infinite
number of games, subsuming network-aware [10], [13] and
network-agnostic [12], [19] methods. One such incentive that
fits this framework is the classic Pigouvian or marginal cost
tax,
Tmc(`)[f ] = f · d
df
`(f), (5)
which is known to incentivize users to route optimally in
many classes of congestion games [14], i.e., fnf = fopt.
This is only true however, when there is no bound on the
incentive and users are homogeneous [19].
To quantify the robustness of an incentive mechanism, we
also consider that the system designer may be unaware of
users’ response to incentives. We denote a set of sensitivity
distributions S = {s : N → [SL, SU]}, where SL > 0 is a
lower bound on users’ sensitivity to incentives and SU ≥ SL
is an upper bound; we include these bounds to quantify the
range of users responses, signifying the amount of possible
player heterogeneity.
Let Lnf(G, s, T ) be the highest total latency in a Nash flow
of the game (G, s, T (L(G))). Additionally, let Lopt(G) be
the total latency under the optimal flow fopt. We use the
price of anarchy to evaluate the performance of a taxation
mechanism, defined as the worst case ratio between total
latency in a Nash flow and an optimal flow. This inefficiency
can be characterized by
PoA(G, s, T ) =
Lnf(G, s, T )
Lopt(G) . (6)
We extend this definition to a family of instances
PoA(G, S, T ) = sup
G∈G
sup
s∈S
Lnf(G, s, T )
Lopt(G) , (7)
where T is used in each network, sensitivity distribution pair.
The price of anarchy is now the worst case inefficiency over
all such network, sensitivity distribution pairs while using in-
centive mechanism T . In the case of homogeneous sensitivity
distributions, we simply omit s and write PoA(G, T ). The
objective of such incentive mechanisms is to minimize this
worst case inefficiency, thus the optimal incentive mechanism
will be defined as,
T opt ∈ arg inf
T :L(G)→T
PoA(G, S, T ), (8)
such that it minimizes the price of anarchy for a class of
games G and set of sensitivity distributions S.
D. Tolls & Subsidies
We differentiate between two forms of incentives, tolls
τ+e : [0, 1] → R≥0 and subsidies τ−e : [0, 1] → R≤0.
With tolls, the player’s observed cost is strictly increased,
i.e., the system designer levies taxes for the users to pay
depending on their choice of edges. With subsidies, the
players cost is strictly reduced, i.e., the system designer
offers some payments to users for their choice of action. The
main focus of this work is to assess which is more effective in
influencing user behavior, tolls or subsidies. To explore this,
we further introduce bounded tolls and subsidies. A bounded
toll will satisfy τ+e (fe) ∈ [0, β · `e(fe)] for fe ∈ [0, 1] and
each e ∈ E, where β is a bounding factor. A bounded tolling
mechanism will be denoted T+(`e;β). Similarly, a bounded
subsidy will satisfy τ−e (fe) ∈ [−β · `e(fe), 0] for fe ∈ [0, 1]
and each e ∈ E, and a bounded subsidy mechanism will be
denoted T−(`e;β).
To compare the efficacy of bounded tolls and subsidies,
we define an optimal bounded tolling mechanism as
T opt+(β, S) ∈ arg inf
T+:L→T +(β)
PoA(G, S, T+), (9)
where
T +(β) = {τ+e ∈ T | τ+e (fe) ∈ [0, β · `e(fe)] ∀fe ∈ [0, 1]}
is the set of all tolling functions. The optimal bounded
subsidy mechanism T opt−(β, S) is defined analogously. For
notational convenience, we will omit the dependence on S
in the homogeneous setting.
E. Summary of Our Contributions
In this setting, questions that arise are
1) How do budgetary constraints on incentives affect the
price of anarchy for homogeneous users?
2) How does player heterogeneity affect the price of anar-
chy of tolls and subsidies?
We address the first question by showing in Theorem 1 that,
with homogeneous users, the price of anarchy of the optimal
subsidy T opt−(β) is no greater than the price of anarchy of
the optimal toll T opt+(β) under the same bounding factor;
we further show this relation is strict in many non-trivial
classes of congestion games. In Theorem 2, we address
question two by showing that for a class of tolls and a
class of subsidies with the same price of anarchy guarantee
in the homogeneous setting, when player heterogeneity is
introduced the optimal robust toll has lower price of anarchy
than the optimal robust subsidy. We offer closed for price
of anarchy bounds in Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 in the
case of affine congestion games to illustrate these result in a
well studied setting.
III. GENERAL RESULTS
A. Bounded Incentives
Though we consider any toll bound β ≥ 0, we offer the
following definition to differentiate from cases where the
bound is insignificantly large or trivially zero.
Definition 1: A toll (subsidy) is tightly bounded if
τ(f) = β`(f), (if τ(f) = −β`(f)) for some f ∈ (0, 1].
When an optimal incentive is tightly bounded, the bud-
getary constraint is active. With this in mind, Theorem 1
states that bounded subsidies will outperform similarly
bounded tolls with respect to the price of anarchy, and strictly
outperform when the budgetary constraint is active.
Theorem 1: For a family of congestion games G, under
a bounding factor β ≥ 0 the optimal subsidy mechanism
T opt−(β) will have no greater price of anarchy than the
optimal tolling mechanism T opt+(β), i.e.,
PoA
(G, T opt+(β)) ≥ PoA (G, T opt−(β)) ≥ 1. (10)
Additionally, if every optimal subsidy is tightly bounded,
then the first inequality in (10) is strict.
The proof of Theorem 1 appears at the end of this subsection;
we first discuss the implications of this result. Theorem 1
implies that when limiting the size of monetary transactions
with users, subsidies are more effective than tolls at influ-
encing user behavior. This result holds for any class of non-
atomic congestion games, including those containing finite
number of games. Though (10) need not be strict in general,
there does exist a gap between the performance of tolls and
subsidies in many, non-trivial settings.
To illustrate this, we offer the following example to
highlight that bounded subsidies outperform bounded tolls
in a well studied class of congestion games.
Example 1: Polynomial Congestion Games. Consider the
class of congestion games Gp, in which,
L(Gp) =
{
`(f) =
p∑
i=0
αif
p | αi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {0, . . . , p}
}
,
typically referred to as polynomial congestion games. Specif-
ically, consider a game with graph G, possessing two nodes
forming a source destination pair with unit mass of traffic
and two parallel edges between them. This example, depicted
in Fig. 1, has been shown to demonstrate the worst case
inefficiency among polynomial congestion games [23].
When users are homogeneous in their sensitivity to incen-
tives, an optimal toll for this class of games is the marginal
cost toll in (5), proven to incentivize optimal routing [14].
Notice that this marginal-cost toll will manifest in this
network as
τmc1 (f1) = pf
p
1 , τ
mc
2 (f2) = 0, (11)
and indeed incentivize the Nash flow to be the system
optimal of f1 = 1/
p√
p+ 1.
Observation 1.1: The set of incentive mechanisms
{T (`) = λTmc(`) + (λ− 1)` | λ > 0} ,
contains all taxation mechanisms that guarantee a price of
anarchy of 1.
This observation can be proven from methods similar to
Theorem 4.1 in [24] and Lemma 1. Intuitively, any other
incentive mechanism will cause users to observe different
costs on an edge, altering the Nash flow from optimal in
some game G ∈ Gp, offering a lower-bound above one.
`1(f1) = f
p
1
`2(f2) = 1
o d
Fig. 1: Price of anarchy in polynomial congestion games. (Left)
worst case game in set of polynomial congestion games [23].
(Right) Price of anarchy under bounded tolls and subsidies; for
illustration, games with polynomial cost functions of degree no
more than degree 4 are used.
Now, suppose β ∈ [ pp+1 , p), the marginal-cost toll is
not feasible, nor is any optimal toll from Observation 1.1.
However, consider the subsidy
T−(`) = (1/(p+ 1)− 1)`+ (1/(p+ 1))Tmc(`),
which exists in the set of optimal incentives. This subsidy
will manifest in the network in Fig. 1 as
τmc1 (f1) = 0, τ
mc
2 (f2) =
−p
p+1 , (12)
and incentivize optimal routing. Because β ∈ [ pp+1 , p), this
subsidy is still feasible under a similar budgetary constraint.
Thus, a bounded subsidy exists that gives a price of anarchy
of one while a similar bounded toll does not exist, giving the
strict difference between subsidies and tolls from Theorem 1.
For β ∈ (0, pp+1 ), though the optimal bounded tolls and
subsidies remains an open question, we conjecture they will
be tightly bounded by the budgetary constraint; thus by
Theorem 1, the optimal bounded subsidy will continue to
strictly outperform the optimal bounded toll. Under tightly
bounded incentives, we can see in Fig. 1 the magnitude of
difference between tolls and subsidies.
In Proposition 3, we explicitly give the price of anarchy
bounds of optimal bounded tolls and subsidies in affine
congestion games, again demonstrating the strictly superior
performance of subsidies as well as illustrating the magnitude
of this difference in performance.
Proof of Theorem 1:
We first show a transformation on incentive mechanisms
that does not affect the price of anarchy under homogeneous
user sensitivities. This transformation gives us the important
relationship between incentive mechanisms that their perfor-
mance is not unique and similar performance can be garnered
with different magnitudes of transactions.
Lemma 1: Let T : L(G)→ T be an incentive mechanism
over the family of congestion games G. If another influencing
mechanism is defined as Tλ(`e) = λT (`e) + (λ − 1)`e for
some λ > 0, then
PoA(G, T ) = PoA(G, Tλ). (13)
The proof of Lemma 1 appears in the appendix.
First, observe that if β = 0 the only permissible influenc-
ing function for tolls and subsidies is τ+e (fe) = τ
−
e (fe) = 0,
i.e., there is no influencing. Therefore, the left and right
hand side of (10) equate to the unincentivized case and the
expression holds with equality.
Let je(fe) = `e(fe) + τe(fe) denote the cost a player
observes for utilizing an edge e when a mass of fe users
are utilizing it. The observed cost of a player x ∈ N
can be rewritten as Jx(Px, f) =
∑
e∈Px je(fe). In the
case where β > 0, a bounded tolling function on an edge
must exist between τ+e (fe) ∈ [0, β · `(fe)], and the edges
observed cost will satisfy j+e (fe) ∈ [`e(fe), (1+β) · `e(fe)].
Similarly, a subsidy function on an edge must exist between
τ−e (fe) ∈ [−β · `(fe), 0], and the edges observed cost will
satisfy j−e (fe) ∈ [(1− β) · `e(fe), `e(fe)].
Let T+(`e;β) be a bounded tolling mechanism with edge
costs of j+e (fe). Now, define Tλ(`e) = λT
+(`e;β) + (λ −
1)`e; from Lemma 1, T+ and Tλ will have the same price
of anarchy for any λ > 0. Let jˆe be the edge cost under
influencing mechanism Tλ, from the construction of Tλ
jˆe = `e+Tλ(`e) = `e+λT
+(`e;β)+(λ−1)`e = λj+e . (14)
We now look at the cases where β ∈ (0, 1) and β ≥ 1
respectively. When β ∈ (0, 1), let λ = (1− β). Now,
jˆe(fe) = (1− β)j+e (fe) ∈ [(1− β)`e(fe), (1− β2)`e(fe)]
⊂ [(1− β)`e(fe), `e(fe)],
thus the edge costs are sufficiently bounded such that Tλ is a
permissible subsidy mechanism bounded by β with the same
price of anarchy as T+. If β ≥ 1 let λ = 1/(1 + β) and get
jˆe(fe) =
1
(1 + β)
j+e (fe) ∈
[
1
(1 + β)
`e(fe), `e(fe)
]
⊂ [(1− β)`e(fe), `e(fe)],
and again Tλ is a permissible subsidy mechanism bounded
by β. By letting T+ = T opt+ we obtain (10).
We have proven that, for β > 0, if PoA(G, T opt−(β)) =
PoA(G, T opt+(β)), then there exists a T opt−(β) that does
not achieve the bound. The contrapositive of this is that
if every optimal subsidy achieves the bound, the price of
anarchy guarantees are not equal. In this case, the optimal
subsidies are each tightly bounded and PoA(G, T opt−(β)) <
PoA(G, T opt+(β)), proving the final part of Theorem 1. 
B. Robustness to User Heterogeneity
We now look at the performance of tolls and subsidies
when users need not have identical responses to incentives.
Often, increased player heterogeneity causes the performance
of an incentive mechanism to diminish. We give the follow-
ing definition for the classes of congestion games with this
property2.
Definition 2: A class of congestion games is responsive
to player heterogeneity if PoA(G, S, T ) is strictly increasing
with SU/SL > 1 for any incentive mechanism T .
These classes of games are those that have a degradation
in performance from increased player heterogeneity; many
classes of well studied congestion games possess this prop-
erty [19].
2There do exist examples of games that do not satisfy Definition 2;
these classes of games are often trivial, including those with a single path
connecting an origin destination pair.
In Theorem 2, we give a robustness result that illustrates
how player heterogeneity has a more drastic impact on the
performance of subsidies than of tolls.
Theorem 2: For a class of congestion games G, define two
incentive bounds β+ and β− such that
PoA
(G, T opt−(β−)) = PoA(G, T opt+(β+)) , (15)
then at the introduction of player heterogeneity,
PoA
(G, S, T opt−(β−, S)) ≥ PoA(G, S, T opt+(β+, S)) ≥ 1.
(16)
Additionally, (16) is strict if G is responsive to player
heterogeneity.
Intuitively, this result stems from the fact that subsidies
are more finely tuned to give performance guarantees. This
fact causes the same amount of player heterogeneity to have a
larger effect on Nash flows than with an equivalent toll. Thus,
when increased player heterogeneity escalates the ineffi-
ciency, this relationship is strict. Though the relationship isn’t
strict for general classes of congestion games, it is for many
well studied cases, including the aforementioned polynomial
congestion games. In Proposition 4, we give price of anarchy
bounds for robust incentives in affine congestion games and
deduce the magnitude of the difference in performance.
Proof of Theorem 2:
First, we give the following definition for incentives that
have the same performance in the homogeneous setting.
Definition 3: For some incentive mechanism T , each
incentive mechanism satisfying Tλ(`e) = (λ − 1)`e +
λT (`e) for some λ > 0 is termed nominally equivalent.
From Lemma 1, nominally equivalent incentives will satisfy,
PoA(G, T ) = PoA(G, Tλ). (17)
We show, in Lemma 2, a relation between nominally
equivalent incentives in the heterogeneous population setting;
specifically, we show that the heterogeneous price of anarchy
decreases as incentives increase costs to the users.
Lemma 2: For a class of congestion games G, let T be
an incentive mechanism. If Tλ is nominally equivalent to T ,
then PoA(G, S, Tλ) is monotonically decreasing with λ.
The proof of Lemma 2 appears in the appendix.
The theorem follows closely from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
It can be inferred from 1 that, for the given bounds β+ and
β−, there exists an optimal toll T opt+(β+) and an optimal
subsidy T opt−(β−) that are nominally equivalent. In fact,
any toll bounded by β+ will have a nominally equivalent
subsidy bounded by β−.
Now, let T opt−(β−, S) be the optimal subsidy with player
heterogeneity bounded by β−. From the fact before, we
know there exists a toll T+ that is nominally equivalent
to T opt−(β−, S) and bounded by β+. From Lemma 2, we
obtain that
PoA(G, S, T+) ≤ PoA(G, S, T opt−(β−, S)), (18)
and by the definition of T opt+(β+, S), we get
PoA(G, S, T opt+(β+, S)) ≤ PoA(G, S, T+). (19)
Combining (18) and (19) gives (16). If the class of games
is responsive to player heterogeneity, then PoA(G, S, Tλ) is
strictly decreasing with λ and the relationship is strict. 
(a) Price of anarchy with
bounded incentives
(b) Price of anarchy with player
heterogeneity
Fig. 2: Price of Anarchy bounds for comparable tolls and subsidies
in affine congestion games. (Left) Price of Anarchy under optimal
toll and subsidy respectively bounded by a factor β. (Right)
Price of Anarchy of a nominally equivalent toll and subsidy with
heterogeneity of user sensitivity introduced; SL/SU expresses the
amount of possible heterogeneity in the population.
IV. AFFINE CONGESTION GAMES
As a means of illustrating some of the results above, we
look at the well studied class of affine congestion games.
Here, we give results on optimal bounded tolls and subsi-
dies and their accompanying performance guarantees whose
relation follow the general results. We include these results
to highlight the appreciable gap in performance between
subsidies and tolls in the homogeneous and heterogeneous
cases respectively.
A. Optimal Bounded Incentives in Affine Congestion Games
We first state the optimal bounded tolls and optimal
bounded subsidies in Proposition 3, as well as give the
associated price of anarchy guarantees. The price of anarchy
bound for the optimal bounded toll and subsidy can be
seen for various incentive bounds in Fig. 2a. Observe that
the optimal subsidy outperforms the optimal toll for each
incentive bound, matching the results from Theorem 1.
Proposition 3: The optimal bounded tolling mechanism in
Gaff is
T opt+(af + b;β) =
{
βax β ∈ [0, 1),
ax β ≥ 1, (20)
with a price of anarchy bound of
PoA(Gaff , T opt+(β)) =
{
4
3+2β−β2 β ∈ [0, 1),
1 β ≥ 1. (21)
Additionally, the optimal bounded subsidy mechanism in
Gaff is
T opt−(af + b;β) =
{
−βb β ∈ [0, 1/2),
−b/2 β ≥ 1/2, (22)
with a price of anarchy bound of
PoA(Gaff , T opt−(β)) =
{
4
3+2βˆ−βˆ2 β ∈ [0, 1/2),
1 β ≥ 1/2, (23)
where βˆ = 1/(1− β)− 1. Accordingly, for any β ∈ (0, 1),
PoA(Gaff , T opt+(β)) < PoA(Gaff , T opt−(β)). (24)
Proof: We first look at the optimal bounded toll and
its associated price of anarchy bound. Trivially, when β > 1
the optimal toll is the marginal cost toll that gives price of
anarchy of one. For a bounding factor β ∈ [0, 1), a feasible
bounded toll must satisfy
τ+e (fe) ∈ [0, β · `e] = [0, βaefe + βbe]. (25)
We can therefore write any feasibly bounded toll as
τ+e (fe) = k1aefe + k2b2 where k1, k2 ∈ [0, β]. We first
show that the optimal toll will have k2 = 0.
Let T+ be a tolling mechanism that assigns bounded tolls
with some k1, k2 ∈ [0, β]. A player x ∈ Ni utilizing path Px
in a flow f will observe cost
Jx(Px, f) =
∑
e∈Px
(1 + k1)aefe + (1 + k2)be. (26)
Now, consider an incentive mechanism Tˆ where edges are
assigned tolls τe(fe) = ( 1+k11+k2 − 1)aefe. Under this new
incentive, the same player as before will now observe cost
Jˆx(Px, f) =
∑
e∈Px
1 + k1
1 + k2
aefe + be. (27)
Because the player’s cost in (26) and (27) are proportional,
the players preserve the same preferences remain unchanged
and the Nash flows remains unaltered. Because ( 1+k11+k2 −1) ≤
k1 ≤ β the new incentive will be bounded by β, and we
need only consider tolls of the form τe(fe) = kaefe when
in search of the optimal bounded toll. When k < 0 the price
of anarchy is at least 4/3 and is indeed not optimal3.
For a tolling mechanism T+(af + b) = kaf with k ∈
[0, β) ⊆ [0, 1), a player’s cost will take the form
Jx(Px, f) =
∑
e∈Px
(1 + k)ae + be. (28)
When player cost functions take this form, the game is
similar to that of an altruistic game (introduced in [25]) and
has price of anarchy of
PoA(Gaff , T+) = 4
3 + 2k − k2 . (29)
The price of anarchy is decreasing with k ∈ [0, 1) and thus
the optimal toll occurs when k is maximized at k = β.
For the optimal subsidy, we now note that incentives must
be bounded by τe(fe) ∈ [−β`e(fe), 0]. From Lemma 1,
we can map any such subsidy to an equivalent toll, now
constrained to the region τˆe(fe) ∈ [0, βˆ`e(fe)] where βˆ =
( 11−β − 1). It was shown prior that the optimal tolling
mechanism in this region will be Tˆ (af + b) = βˆaf . Finally,
we can again use Lemma 1 to map back to the optimal
bounded subsidy,
T opt−(af + b) = (λ− 1)(af + b) + λTˆ (af + b), (30)
with λ = 1−β. The result is an optimal subsidy of the form
T opt−(af+b) = −βb for β ∈ [0, 1/2). The price of anarchy
bound comes from considering the equivalent toll.
3Consider the classic Pigou network, as in Fig. 1 with p = 1. It is well
known this network gives the worst case price of anarchy of 4/3 with Nash
flow of f1 = 1. Consider using a taxation mechanism T (af + b) = kaf
for some k < 0 and observe that the Nash flow is unchanged, thus not
reducing the price of anarchy for the class of affine congestion games.
B. Robustness of Incentives in Affine Congestion Games
In this section, we specifically look at the optimal scaled
marginal cost toll in parallel affine congestion games where
each edge is utilized in the Nash flow, Gpa, with player
heterogeneity, T smc(af + b) = (
√
SLSU)
−1af . This tolling
mechanism was first introduced in [26], and was shown to
minimize the price of anarchy over parallel affine congestion
games with sensitivity distributions in S bounded by SL and
SU. In Proposition 4, we give price of anarchy bounds on
the optimal scaled marginal cost toll as well as a nominally
equivalent subsidy T nes.
Proposition 4: Let Gpa be the set of fully-utilized parallel
affine congestion games with sensitivity distributions in
S. The optimal scaled marginal cost tolling mechanism is
T smc(af + b) = af√
SLSU
with price of anarchy
PoA(Gpa, S, T smc) = 4
3
(
1−
√
q
(1 +
√
q)2
)
. (31)
where q := SL/SU. Additionally, a nominally equivalent
subsidy will be T nes(af + b) = − 1
1+
√
SLSU
b, with price of
anarchy
PoA(Gpa, S, T nes) = 4
3
(
1−
√
qˆ
(1 +
√
qˆ)2
)
, (32)
where
qˆ =
λq
1− q + λq < q,
and λ =
√
SLSU/(1 +
√
SLSU).
Observe that, because qˆ < q in (31) and (32) the nominally
equivalent subsidy has greater price of anarchy when player
heterogeneity is introduced. This can be seen in Fig. 2b.
Intuitively, the same amount of player heterogeneity will
have a larger effect on the subsidy than the toll.
Proof: This first part of the proposition comes
from [26]. We thus find the nominally equivalent subsidy
mechanism and find the associated price of anarchy bound.
For notational convenience, let k = 1/
√
SLSU; the robust
marginal cost toll is thus T smc(af + b) = kaf . From
Lemma 1, we can derive a nominally equivalent subsidy by
T nes(af + b) = (λ − 1)(af + b) + λ(kaf), for and λ > 0.
By letting λ = 1/(1 + k), we get the nominally equivalent
subsidy to be T nes(af + b) = −kb/(1 + k) = − 1
1+
√
SLSU
b.
To determine the price of anarchy of T nes with player
heterogeneity, we use the result of Theorem 2 to deter-
mine the equivalent level of heterogeneity on the nominally
equivalent toll, T smc. Let s ∈ S be a feasible sensitivity
distribution, bounded by SL and SU. As it is defined above,
we seek to find the preimage of [SL, SU] under the function
g(S, 1/(1 + k)). Without loss of generality, we normalize
[SL, SU], to [q, 1] and look for it’s preimage. Because g is
continuous on S ∈ [0, 1], we look at the endpoints of the
region. We first note that g(1, λ) = 1 for any λ > 0. Next,
we determine qˆ such that g(qˆ, λ) = q as
qˆ =
λq
1− q + λq ,
and by setting λ = 1/(1 + k) =
√
SLSU/(1 +
√
SLSU)
recover the equivalent amount of heterogeneity, qˆ, on T smc as
the original subsidy T nes with heterogeneity q. By replacing
q with qˆ in (31) we obtain the price of anarchy for T nes with
heterogeneity.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper offers an extensive comparison of the perfor-
mance of tolls and subsidies in congestion games. In settings
where budgetary constraints exist, subsidies appear to offer
similar performance to tolls while requiring smaller monetary
transactions with the users. However, in the presence of
player heterogeneity, it becomes clear that subsidies fail to
offer the same robustness as tolls. Ongoing work focuses on
understanding how important robustness is and at what level
of player heterogeneity will it become more advantageous to
implement tolls than subsidies.
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APPENDIX
We prove Lemma 1 using the definition of the Nash flow,
and by showing this transformation does not affect user
preferences.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Let f ′ be a Nash flow for a game G ∈ G under influencing
mechanism T . User x ∈ Ni observes cost
Jx(Px, f
′) =
∑
e∈Px
`e(f
′
e) + τe(f
′
e), (33)
and by the definition of Nash flow, will have preferences
satisfying
Jx(Px, f
′) ≤ Jx(P ′, f ′)), ∀P ′ ∈ Pi. (34)
In the same flow f ′, but now under influencing mechanism
Tˆ , user x will observe cost
Jˆx(Px, f
′) =
∑
e∈Px
`e(f
′
e) + λτe(f
′
e) + (λ− 1)`e(f ′e), (35)
=
∑
e∈Px
λ(τe(f
′
e) + `e(f
′
e)) (36)
= λJx(Px, f
′). (37)
Observe that through the same process, it can be shown that
Jˆx(P, f
′) = λJx(P, f ′) for every P ∈ Pi. From (34),
(1/λ)Jˆx(Px, f
′) ≤ (1/λ)Jˆx(Px, f ′), ∀Px ∈ Pi (38)
Jˆx(Px, f
′) ≤ Jˆx(Px, f ′), ∀Px ∈ Pi. (39)
(39) holds for all x ∈ N , satisfying that f ′ is a Nash
equilibrium in G under Tˆ . It is therefore the case that
any equilibrium in any game G ∈ G under T is also an
equilibrium under Tˆ , thus
Lnf(G,T ) = Lnf(G, Tˆ ), (40)
and, because this holds for every game G ∈ G, it certainly
holds for the supremum over the set which is the same as
(13) by definition. 
Proof of Lemma 2:
First, we assume without loss of generality, that SL = 1.
To see this, we make an equivalent problem where this
is true and show the same price of anarchy bound will
hold. Let T be any incentive mechanism and S be a family
of sensitivity distributions with lower bound SL and upper
bound SU. In any game G ∈ G, a player x ∈ Ni will observe
costs as expressed in (3). Observe that if we normalize
every sensitivity distribution s ∈ S by multiplying by 1/SL
and correspondingly scale the incentive by SL the player
cost remains unchanged. It is therefore the case that any
equilibrium is preserved and unchanged, enforcing that
PoA(G, S, T ) = PoA (G, S/SL, SL · T ) . (41)
Accordingly, we will consider that SL = 1 throughout.
Let f be a flow in G ∈ G under sensitivity distribution
s ∈ S an incentive mechanism T that assigns tolls τ+e . From
Lemma 1 a nominally equivalent incentive mechanism can
be found by using the transformation Tˆ+(`e;λ) = (λ −
1)`e + λT (`e), where choosing λ sufficiently close to zero
will cause Tˆ to be a subsidy mechanism. We will show that
for any λ ∈ (0, 1), the incentive mechanism Tˆ will perform
worse than T at the introduction of player heterogeneity.
Let sˆ be a new sensitivity distribution such that
sˆx = g(sx, λ) =
sx
λ+ sx − sxλ, (42)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Now, consider an agent’s cost in flow f
with sensitivity sˆ under incentive mechanism Tˆ . An agent
x ∈ Ni utilizing path Px in f experiences cost,
Jˆx(Px, f) =
∑
e∈Px
`e(fe) + sˆxTˆ (`e(fe);λ)
=
∑
e∈Px
`e(fe) + sˆx[(λ− 1)`e + λτ+e (fe)]
=
λ
λ+ sx − sxλ
∑
e∈Px
(`e(fe) + sxτe(fe)),
which is proportional to Jx(Px, f). By observing propor-
tional costs, players preserve the same preferences over
paths, preserving the same Nash flows.
Finally, we show that sˆ is a feasible sensitivity distribution
in S. From the original bounds SL and SU, any generated
distribution sˆ will exist between g(SL, λ) and g(SU, λ). From
before, SL = 1, thus from (42), g(SL = 1, λ) = 1 = SL, for
any λ ∈ (0, 1). Now, observe that any generated distribution
will satisfy
g(SU, λ) =
SU
λ+ SU − SUλ ≤ SU, (43)
for any λ ∈ (0, 1). Thus any generated distribution sˆ
is sufficiently bounded by SL and SU and is a feasible
distribution in S. By choosing f to be a Nash flow, we can
see that any Nash flow that can be induced by some s ∈ S
while using T can similarly be induced by sˆ ∈ S while using
Tˆ . It is therefore the case that the price of anarchy with
user heterogeneity will increase as λ decreases, showing the
monotonicity. 
